I am an Assistant Professor of Finance at Korea University Business School. My research areas are in corporate finance and spans its subareas of labor and finance, entrepreneurial finance, corporate governance, and corporate social responsibility.
Abstract: Using novel quasi-natural experiment and population-level data, this paper shows involuntary contingent employment reduces innovation. Innovation increases when a firm secures unsecured employees without a simultaneous increase in R&D and capital intensity. The finding is conditional on long-term rewards in place. Furthermore, startups and jobs are created in industries and cities where the security provision escalates innovative activities. The experiment capitalizes on a work arrangement unique in Korea, under which marginal contingent workers do the same core tasks with marginal regular workers, and a Supreme Court ruling against the arrangement.
Conferences: MFA 2021, SFA 2021, RES 2021, ISHCLM 2020
Featured in University of Cambridge Judge Business School's News & Insight (Link)
Abstract: On September 30, 2018, California became the first U.S. state to set quotas for women directors on corporate boards. The law resulted in a decline in shareholder value for firms headquartered in California. This decline increases with the number of female directors required to be added under these quotas. We find evidence that supply-side constraints drive the announcement effects. The law expanded the supply of women in the director pool. Female directors appointed to meet the quotas are as skilled as male directors, but possess a less similar set of skills and are given fewer responsibilities on the board.
Featured in Harvard Law School's Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (Link)
Abstract: Decades of research on corporate boards have wrestled with the issue that board composition is endogenously determined by CEO and board and therefore relays incomplete information about board independence. This paper establishes that there exist circumstances under which CEO reveals the private information she has made a board non-independent and that her decision constitutes perfect Bayesian equilibria. Furthermore, the paper shows that the revelation is followed by a sharp decline in firm valuation and board monitoring quality. The results are stronger for firms in a poor information environment. Tests based on sudden director deaths suggest the evidence is causal.
Shareholder- vs. Stakeholder-Initiated Corporate Social Responsibility
Abstract: Available upon request.
Does Diversification of Share Classes Increase Firm Value? with Sojung Kim and Woochan Kim, 2020, Asian Review of Financial Research
When Heirs Become Major Shareholders: Evidence on Pyramiding Financed by Related-Party Sales with Woochan Kim, 2016, Journal of Corporate Finance
Managerial Entrenchment of Anti-Takeover Devices: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Korea with Woochan Kim, 2012, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal